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1 Introduction
Alexopoulou (2008) argues that Greek provides new evidence for the concept
of binding illusions that was hypothesized by Fox and Sauerland (1996). Of
special interest from my perspective is Alexopoulou’s argument that binding
illusionsarisenotonlywithexistentialanduniversalquantiﬁers, butalsowith
negative and interrogative quantiﬁers. The purpose of this note is to speculate
on how to account for these kinds of binding illusions semantically building
on Alexopoulou’s argument.
In the following I refer to Alexopoulou’s (2008) paper as BIRG (Binding Il-
lusions and Resumption in Greek) and to Clitic Left-Dislocation as CLLD. BIRG’s
argument is based on the generalization concerning CLLD in Greek. Gen-
erally, a left-dislocated noun phrase cannot bind a pronoun in its clause in
Greek.
(1) (Alexopoulou, 2008, (2))
a. ∗Kanena
no-ACC
ﬁtiti
student-ACC
dhen
not
ton
him
idha
saw-1SG
sto
at-the
parti
party
b. ∗Pion
who-ACC
ton
saw-2SG
idhes
at-the
sto
party
parti
But, CLLD is possible in two cases in Greek. The ﬁrst are non-quantiﬁcational
noun phrases like proper names in (2-a), deﬁnites, and speciﬁc indeﬁnites as
in (2-c).
(2) a. (Alexopoulou, 2008, (1a))
To
the
Yani
Yani-ACC
ton
him
idha
saw-1SG
sto
at-the
party.
party
‘I met Yanis at the party.’
b. (Alexopoulou, 2008, (38a))
ena
an
arthro
article
tu
the-GEN
Chomsky
Chomsky
to
it
diavase
read-3SG
kathe
every
ﬁtitis
student-NOM
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‘Every student read an article by Chomsky.’ (a   every, *every  
a)
To account for this exception one can appeal to the distinction between coref-
erence and binding of Reinhart (1983): The example in (2) can involve coref-
erence and therefore ﬁt into the generalization the binding is impossible.
The second case of grammatical CLLD are generic sentences where even
quantiﬁers can occur. (3) shows an example with a universal.
(3) Kathe
each
dhiatrivi
dissertation
ti
it
dhiavazume
read-1PL
pada
always
me
with
megali
big
prosohi
attention
(BIRG, (8-c))
‘We always read each dissertation with great attention.’
Also negative quantiﬁers are possible in generic sentences with CLLD:
(4) Kanena
noone-ACC
dhen
not
ton
him
apoliun
ﬁre-3PL
etsi
like-this
(BIRG, (8-a))
‘You ﬁre noone like this.’
And ﬁnally, even questions are possible with an interrogative quantiﬁer un-
dergoing CLLD:
(5) Pion
who-ACC
ton
him
apoliun
ﬁre-3PL
etsi
like-this
(BIRG, (8-d))
‘Who do you ﬁre like this?’
BIRG proposes to account for all three cases as binding illusions. The intu-
ition underlying this proposal is the following: Assume a representation like
(6) where both the quantiﬁer and the pronoun are in the scope of a generic
quantiﬁer. Then, the quantiﬁer can be trivialized by the restriction to a par-
ticular situation – speciﬁcally, a universal quantiﬁer would be trivialized in a
situation that contains only one individual satisfying its restriction. The pro-
noun can then be coreferential with the trivialized quantiﬁer.
(6) GENe [Quant(e) ... pro(e) ...]
As far as I can see, the conclusion that we are looking at binding illusions
is essentially correct and will assume so in following. The question, I ad-
dress in the following are the consequences of this discovery for the semantics
of binding illusions. Of the three quantiﬁers that allow binding illusions in
Greek, only the semantic account for universal quantiﬁers is available (Fox
and Sauerland, 1996). For negative and interrogative quantiﬁers, no semantic
account is available. But the Greek facts necessitate that we look for one, and
the following speculation has that goal.
In this note, I suggest ﬁrst to analyze CLLD noun phrases as aboutness
topics with a semantics that requires there to be a unique maximal situation
that is about the dislocated noun phrase in episodic sentences. This unique-
ness requirement derives the restriction of CLLD to non-quantiﬁcational NPs
in episodic sentences. In generic sentences, I assume that there is quantiﬁca-
tion over situations and therefore dislocated noun phrases are not restricted in3
the same way. I conclude that the analysis of binding illusions with negative
quantiﬁers requires decomposition of the negative quantiﬁer into negation
and an indeﬁnite. Furthermore, the analysis of binding illusions for interrog-
ative quantiﬁers follows directly.
2 Universals and Aboutness
My goal is to construct a set of semantic hypotheses that can account for the
Greek data. I start with making the account of binding illusions with univer-
sals more precise. One question left open by the account in BIRG is how the
left-dislocated quantiﬁers enter the semantics of the clause. I will assume that
there is a relation ABOUT between situations and individuals that entails that
the individual is the most salient individual in the situation:
(7) s ABOUT x entails that x   s and for all y   s: x is more salient than y
Furthermore, I assume that salience is a partial order of individuals. Then for
any situation s there is at most one individual x such that s is about x.
Consider CLLD in example (8) (repeated from (2-a)). I assume that the
topic is interpreted as a deﬁnite description of a situation as shown in (9).1
(8) To
the
Yani
Yani-ACC
ton
him
idha
saw-1SG
sto
at-the
party.
party
‘I met Yanis at the party.’
(9) thes [λs . s ABOUT Yanis] [λs . I met the Yanis in s at the party]
The deﬁnite description selects the situation that contains Yanis and all less
salient individuals (possible up to some limit on situation size as discussed
below).
For universals, the semantics of ABOUT makes a desirable prediction. Con-
sider the abstract example in (10), which according to the discussion in BIRG
should be ungrammatical in Greek with CLLD.
(10) ∗Every student, she ﬁred him like that. (PSEUDOGREEK2)
The logical form representation of (10) is shown in (11). I assume that the
quantiﬁer every student takes scope within the topic phrase, but cannot take
scope higher up.3 Representation (11) is not interpretable if there is more than
one student because it requires that there be a situation s where each student
1The deﬁnite thes has the usual semantics of deﬁnites: It presupposes the existence of a
unique, maximal situation satisfying its restrictor and then denotes this situation.
2In the following, I use a paradigm of abstract examples to focus on the semantic analysis
of Greek CLLD. Dora Alexopoulou (p.c.) points out to me that not all of the examples of my
‘Pseudogreek’ actually translate straightforwardly into actual Greek. Especially, for the binding
illusion effect, examples with impersonal subjects give the clearest judgments. Nevertheless it
seems useful to me to abstract away for these effects for the time being.
3A representation with wider scope for the universal is shown in (i). This should be inter-
pretable if the referent of she is less salient than each of the students. I assume that (i) violates the
syntactic locality requirement of quantiﬁer raising.
(i) [every student in s][ λx . thes [λs . s ABOUT x][ λs . she ﬁred the student in s like that]]4
in s is the unique most salient part of s. I assume that (10) is ungrammatical in
Greek for this reason.
(11) thes [λs . [every student in s][ λx . s ABOUT x]] [λs . she ﬁred the
student in s like that]
BIRG argues that generic sentences like (10) are, however, grammatical.
Consider again just the English gloss of a hypothetical Greek example:
(12) Every student, she generally ﬁres him like that. (PSEUDOGREEK)
Assume that the topic in (12) is not interpreted as a deﬁnite, but using a
generic quantiﬁer over situations:
(13) Gens [λs . [every student in s][ λx . s ABOUT x]] [λs . she ﬁred the
student in s like that]
Representation (13) is assigned an interpretation that requires that she ﬁred
each student. This is the desired interpretation.
3 On Illusions with No
Negative quantiﬁers like no present additional difﬁculties. First consider the
episodic example (14).
(14) ∗No student, she ﬁred him like that. (PSEUDOGREEK)
Following the discussion in the previous section, the LF-representation for
(14) is (15). The deﬁnite description denotes different situation depending on
whether the most salient individual is a student or not. If the most salient
individual is a student, the deﬁnite description selects the maximal situation
not containing any of the students. However, then the deﬁnite the student in s
has no referent. This could be reason why examples like (14) are ungrammat-
ical in Greek. But, if the most salient individual is not a student, the deﬁnite
description selects the maximal situation, i.e. the current world of evaluation,
since this situation is not about any of the students, but about the maximally
salient individual. Possibly, the total situation is not a good situation to be in-
troduced by left dislocated material since it is the default evaluation situation.
If this is the case, we predict (14) to be ungrammatical (or at least semantically
odd).
(15) thes [λs . [no student in s][ λx . s ABOUT x]] [λs . she ﬁred the student
in s like that]
Next, consider the generic counterpart of (14) in (16). According to BIRG,
real examples like (16) are grammatical in Greek.
(16) No student, she generally ﬁres him like that. (PSEUDOGREEK)
The representation in (17) does not offer a reason why (16) should be gram-
matical in comparison to (14). If the maximally salient individual is a student,
(17) involves generic quantiﬁcation about student-free situations. If the max-
imally salient individual is not a student, (17) involves generic quantiﬁcation5
over situations that do not include a student as the most salient individual in
them.
(17) Gens [λs . [no student in s][ λx . s ABOUT x]] [λs . she ﬁred the student
in s like that]
There is reason to believe that (17) should not be a pragmatically well-formed
interpretation in either one of these cases. Quantiﬁers over situation generally
require that the situations they quantify over be at least not contained in each
other (cf. Kratzer 1989; Percus 2007). This can be build into the semantics of
Gens as follows:
(18) [ [Gens] ](R)(S)=1i fa n donly if for all s that satisfy R(s)=1 and
¬∃t(R(t)=1ands   t)
But, then the Gens in (17) is predicted to be equivalent to a deﬁnite because
it either quantiﬁes only over the current worlds or the maximal student-free
situation. Such a redundant use of genericity, we should expect to be odd.
I propose therefore to account for the Greek data by splitting the negative
quantiﬁer into a negation and an indeﬁnite (see Zeijlstra 2004 and references
there). Then we arrive at the representation in (19) for the episodic sentence:
(19) thes [λs . [a student in s][ λx . s ABOUT x]] [λs . she didn’t ﬁre the
student in s like that]
If ABOUT is true of any situation that has x as its most salient part, (19) is pre-
dicted to be acceptable. The deﬁnite selects the maximal situation containing
all the students and all individuals less salient then the maximally salient stu-
dent. The sentence expresses then that she did not ﬁre the most salient student
in a particular way. This would not be the desired result.
However, if we assume that ABOUT is more restrictive the result can differ.
For example, we could add the assumption that s ABOUT x entails that s is
a convex spatiotemporal region surrounding x. Then, it would not follow
any more that the maximal situation ABOUT the most salient student contain
all other situation that are about a student. This entails that the uniqueness
requirement of the deﬁnite cannot be fulﬁlled. So, it would follow that (14) is
odd.
Now, consider the generic representation (20). Since the generic does not
requireaunique, maximalsituation, representation(20)ispredictedtobefully
acceptable, and receives the desired interpretation.
(20) Gens [λs . [a student in s][ λx . s ABOUT x]] [λs . she didn’t ﬁre the
student in s like that]
Compare this account to the sketch BIRG provides in section 3.2. BIRG
notes that a scope illusion exists in English with negative quantiﬁers in (21).
The generic (21-b) seems to allow a reading where no takes scope over a guide
that the episodic (21-a) lacks.
(21) (BIRG, (34))
a. Yesterday, a guide ensured that no tour to the Louvre was late.
b. In general, a guide ensures that no tour to the Louvre is late.6
In the spirit of scope illusions, BIRG assumes that the generic quantiﬁer must
take scope over the negative quantiﬁer. The paraphrase offered in BIRG is the
following.
(22) For every relevant situation s, a guide ensures that no tour to the Lou-
vre is late.
BIRG assume that relevant situations are those containing one guide and one
tour to achieve the desire result. Our analysis here is fully compatible: To
make more precise what relevant situations are, we assume that relevant sit-
uations are situations that are ABOUT a tour. Then the correct interpretation
is predicted in (22). One crucial difference between the scope illusion in (22)
and the Greek binding illusions is that in (22) the negative quantiﬁer remains
in the scope of the generic quantiﬁer, while in the Greek example it enters the
restrictor. For this reason, scope splitting is not necessary in English, but as
far as I can see, the analysis of the Greek data requires it.
4 On Illusions with Questions
For questions I again consider a pseudo-Greek pair of examples. The episodic
(23) with CLLD is ungrammatical in Greek.
(23) ∗Which student she ﬁred him like that? (PSEUDOGREEK)
Assume a simpliﬁed version of the semantics of questions of Karttunen (1977).
For example, the question (24-a) is represented as (24-b) as a set of proposi-
tions.
(24) a. Which student did she ﬁre?
b. λp .[ ∃ [lx . student(x)] [λx . p = λw . [she ﬁred x in w]]]
For universal quantiﬁers, I showed in footnote 3 that the restrictor of the
situation quantiﬁer must be a syntactic island. Hence, pied-piping as in (25)
should be the only available representation. Since the scope of the deﬁnite
is the same is in (19) above, (25) is expected to be unacceptable for the same
reasons.
(25) λp . [thes [λs . [a student in s][ λx . s ABOUT x]] [λs .[ p = λw . [she
ﬁred the student in s like that in w]]]]
Now consider the generic which according to BIRG should be an accept-
able example of CLLD in Greek.
(26) Which student she generally ﬁres him like that? (PSEUDOGREEK)
If we pied-pipe in the same fashion as in (25), the result is (27).
(27) λp . [Gens [λs . [a student in s][ λx . s ABOUT x]] [λs .[ p = λw . [she
ﬁred the student in s like that in w]]]]
This representation is unusual because the generic quantiﬁer intervenes be-
tween the formation of a set of propositions and the identity requirement on
the propositions. An exact identity requirement between p and the proposi-BIBLIOGRAPHY 7
tion following it cannot be fulﬁlled if more than one student exists. But, if we
change the semantics of questions to require entailment rather than identity
as in (28), the result is the desired one.
(28) λp . [Gens [λs . [a student in s][ λx . s ABOUT x]] [λs .[ p → λw . [she
ﬁred the student in s like that in w]]]]
The interpretation of (28) can be paraphrased as follows: Tell me something
suchthatIcangenerallyconcludeforasituationthatisaboutastudentwhether
she ﬁred the student in a particular way in that situation.
5 Conclusion
In sum, this note has tried to validate the semantic intuition of Alexopoulou
(2008) that generic quantiﬁcation can lead to binding illusions with negative
and interrogative quantiﬁers as well as universals, and did so successfully.
FollowingtheinterestingdiscussionofAlexopoulou’sGreekdatahastakenus
to the semantics of genericity and aboutness topics. The account I put together
can be summarized as follows:
Topics introduce situations that are about certain individuals. The about-
ness relation between situations and individuals I have left largely unspeci-
ﬁed, but I claimed that at least an individual must be the most salient one in
any situation about it and that there must be further limits on the size of the
situation. In episodic sentences with a topic, I assumed that there must be a
unique situation that they are about. This predicts that generally topichood in
episodic sentences is incompatible with quantiﬁcation.
The effect of genericity in my proposal is largely due to the fact that the
uniqueness requirement is not made in generic sentences. Instead, I assume
that it is required that generally for situation about the topic a certain state
must hold.
The one case where my predictions diverge from Alexopoulou’s account
are negative quantiﬁers. My analysis predicts that negative quantiﬁers will
only allow binding illusions when the negative quantiﬁer is decomposed into
an indeﬁnite and negation. Negation furthermore must be interpreted in the
clause where the pronoun occurs.
Bibliography
Alexopoulou, Dora: 2008, ‘Binding illusions and resumption in Greek’, in S.
Iatridou (ed.), Proceedings of the Workshop on Greek Syntax and Semantics. MIT
Working Papers in Linguistics, Cambridge, Mass. (this volume).
Fox, Danny and Uli Sauerland: 1996, ‘Illusive scope of universal quantiﬁers’,
in K. Kusumoto (ed.), Proceedings of NELS 26, 71–85. GLSA, Amherst.
Karttunen, Lauri: 1977, ‘The syntax and semantics of questions’, Linguistics
and Philosophy 1, 1–44.
Kratzer, Angelika: 1989, ‘An investigation of the lumps of thought’, Linguistics
and Philosophy 12, 607–653.BIBLIOGRAPHY 8
Percus, Orin: 2007, ‘Pragmatic constraints on adverbial quantiﬁcation’, in U.
Sauerland and P. Stateva (eds.), Presupposition and Implicature in Composi-
tional Semantics. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, UK.
Reinhart, Tanya: 1983, ‘Coreference and bound anaphora: A restatement of
the anaphora questions’, Linguistics and Philosophy 6, 47–88.
Zeijlstra, Hedde: 2004, Sentential Negation and Negative Concord, Doctoral Dis-
sertation, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands.